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OUT OF SERVICE: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
RUSSIA’S SUSPENSION OF JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE 
UNITED STATES UNDER THE HAGUE SERVICE 
CONVENTION 
SPENCER WILLIG* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Somewhere in the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, nestled 
in the “Mecca of international law,”1 there is a file containing the 
ratification instruments for the Hague Convention on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters.2  A researcher confined to this Dutch filing 
cabinet could reasonably conclude that judicial assistance flows 
freely between Russia and the United States under the Convention.  
Both states have ratified it,3 and neither country has entered 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.A. 
Candidate, May 2010, Lauder Institute of Management and International Studies, 
University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2006, University of Pennsylvania.  This Note 
and its Author owe their existence to Drs. Rosette and Kenneth Willig. 
1 See, e.g., Guillaume Sacriste & Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International 
Law: Lawyers’ Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s, 32 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 83, 89–90 (2007) (observing that the capital of the Netherlands has been 
considered the “Mecca of international law” since the early 1920s). 
2 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters art. 26, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention or Convention] 
(designating the depository location for the instruments of ratification). 
3 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Status Table: 14: 
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, http://www.hcch.net 
/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17 [hereinafter Hague Service 
Convention Status Table] (providing a comprehensive listing of countries and 
their signatory status regarding the Hague Service Convention.  See also RSM 
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reservations or declarations expressly declining to recognize the 
other’s rights under the Convention.4 
This commitment to mutual judicial assistance should be a 
triumph for the Hague Conference.  Russia and the United States 
have fundamentally different legal systems5 and a uniquely 
complicated political relationship.6  Setting aside the antagonism 
that often characterizes Russo-American relations,7 simply 
building a workable transnational litigation bridge between a civil 
and a common law jurisdiction would be a significant feather in 
the Hague Conference’s cap.8 
Russo-American judicial cooperation in the world beyond the 
Convention’s pages, however, leaves much to be desired.  Russia 
effectively severed Hague Service Convention ties with U.S. courts 
in July 2003 and continues to rebuff efforts to restore “normal 
judicial cooperation.”9  Though this policy is purportedly 
grounded in Russia’s interpretation of Article 12 of the 
Convention, this Note will demonstrate that Russia’s legal 
 
Production Corp. v. Fridman, Civ. A. No. 06-11512, 2007 WL 2295907, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007) (approaching analysis of service under the Hague Service 
Convention “with the understanding that the convention is currently in force” 
between Russia and the United States). 
4 The Hague Conference on Private International Law maintains a 
comprehensive listing of each member state’s declarations and reservations on its 
website.  Hague Service Convention Status Table, supra note 3. 
5 Russia and the United States feature civil and common law legal systems, 
respectively.  See, e.g., Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A 
Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1107 n.125 (2008) 
(identifying major civil and common law jurisdictions).  As discussed in Section 3, 
infra, the development of the Russian legal community and its role in private 
international law policy-making also differs significantly from the corresponding 
narrative in the United States. 
6 See infra Section 3. 
7 See, e.g., Alexei Arbatov, Eurasia Letter: A Russian-U.S. Security Agenda, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Autumn 1996, at 102, 117 (describing the fragility of 
“nonconfrontational” relations between the United States and Russia). 
8 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1183, 1190 (2004) (identifying the “promised reconciliation” of differing civil and 
common law litigation practices as a major goal of the Hague Conference regime). 
9 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Russia Judicial Assistance, 
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_3831.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
2009) [hereinafter State Department Website].  This source also provides a brief 
summary of the breakdown in Hague Service Convention relations from the 
perspective of the U.S. government. See also Kuklachev v. Gelfman, No. 08-CV-
2214 (CPS), 2008 WL 5068860, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008) (noting Russia has 
suspended judicial cooperation with the United States, although it remains a 
signatory to the Hague Service Convention). 
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argument is pretextual. Analysis of Russia’s Hague Service 
Convention participation in the context of the country’s foreign 
policy agenda, judicial system, and legal culture suggests that the 
collapse of the Convention channel was caused by the very 
differences the Hague Conference is supposed to overcome. 
Exploration of the factors behind Russia’s suspension of 
Convention cooperation with the United States invites discussion 
of the implications for parties in U.S. courts seeking to effect 
service on Russian soil, and for the future of transnational litigation 
generally.  Each of these issues will be addressed below. 
First, however, a quick overview of the Hague system is in 
order.  The remainder of this Section will survey the Hague Service 
Convention regime, identify the Convention’s status under 
Russian and U.S. law, and review basic facts surrounding the 
Russo-American dispute over the application of the Convention 
between the two states. 
1.1.  The Hague Service Convention: Origins, Importance, and 
Structure 
The Hague Service Convention is a product of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law [hereinafter Hague 
Conference], an “intergovernmental organization with its own 
legal personality under public international law.”10  The Hague 
Conference is the premiere international body working to develop 
a unified private international law regime.11  The Hague Service 
Convention itself, with fifty-nine contracting states including all of 
the members of the G8,12 is intended to apply in “all cases, in civil 
or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a 
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”13  The 
Hague Service Convention’s status as the standard legal 
 
10 Andrea Schulz, The Accession of the European Community to the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 939, 939 (2007). 
11 Id. at 949.  See also Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct 
Field?  The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 301, 313 (2008) (describing the Hague Conference as “the leading international 
organization devoted to facilitating international judicial cooperation through 
multilateral treaties”). 
12 Hague Service Convention Status Table, supra note 3. 
13 Hague Service Convention, supra note 2. 
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framework governing transnational service is unlikely to change in 
the near future.14 
A key feature of the Hague Service regime is the “Central 
Authority.”15  Under Article 2 of the Hague Service Convention, 
each state party must establish a Central Authority to act as an 
international service clearing house, receiving requests for service 
from courts abroad and then effecting service within its borders.16  
The Central Authority’s transmission of foreign judicial documents 
defuses a potential “diplomatic breach-of-sovereignty concern,” as 
the country in which service is sought uses its own officials to 
effect service.17  Though creation of a Central Authority is 
mandatory,18 member states can and have consented to alternate 
methods of service under the Convention19 in addition to the basic 
required Convention channel; these alternate methods include 
postal and non-Hague diplomatic channels.20  Whether service is 
made through a Central Authority directly or through another 
approved Convention channel, “[c]ompliance with the Hague 
[Service] Convention is of paramount importance to ensure 
subsequent recognition of a judgment in a Hague signatory 
country.”21 
 
14 See Richard J. Hawkins, Comment, Dysfunctional Equivalence: The New 
Approach to Defining “Postal Channels” Under the Hague Service Convention, 55 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 205, 213 (2007) (noting “there is significant potential for the 
Convention to continue to broaden its reach across borders”). 
15 Id. (characterizing the Central Authority as “the centerpiece and principal 
innovation of the Convention” regime). 
16 For a summary of the relevant features of the convention see 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698–99 (1988). 
17 Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Forum Shopping and Other Reflections on Litigation 
Involving U.S. and European Businesses, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 465, 474 (1995). 
18 Id. 
19 See Schlunk, 386 U.S. at 699. 
20 Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 10.  See also Hawkins, supra 
note 14, at 214. 
21 Yvonne A. Tamayo, Catch Me If You Can: Serving United States Process on an 
Elusive Defendant Abroad, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211, 236 (2003).  Dowling also 
emphasizes the heightened importance of proper service in international 
litigation.  Dowling, supra note 17, at 473 (“Many U.S. judgments against foreign 
defendants have been rendered unenforceable due to service of process defects 
established in foreign courts at the enforcement stage.”). 
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1.2. Acceptance and Interpretation of the Hague Service Convention 
under U.S. and Russian Law  
Both the United States and Russia have signed and ratified the 
Convention.22  The United States Supreme Court considers the 
Convention self-executing;23 under “the Supremacy Clause, U.S. 
Const., Art. VI, the Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods of 
service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies.”24 
The Russian Federation also considers itself bound by the 
Convention and has passed implementing legislation to that effect 
[hereinafter Russian Implementing Statute].25  The Russian 
Constitution features a provision similar to the U.S. Supremacy 
Clause, mandating that treaties concluded by the Russian 
Federation take precedence over conflicting domestic legislation,26 
unless they are declared unconstitutional by the federal 
Constitutional Court.27 
Russia and the United States observe the same basic principles 
of treaty interpretation.  Russia is a party to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter Vienna Convention],28 while the 
United States largely abides by the Vienna Convention’s terms, 
 
22 Hague Status Table, supra note 3. 
23 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy 
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 637 n.175 
(2008) (citing Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699–700) (characterizing the Hague Service 
Convention as self-executing). 
24 Schlunk, 486 U.S., at 699. 
25 Federal’yi Zakon RF ot Feb. 12, 2001 N. 10-FZ “O Prisoedinenii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii k Konventsii o Vruchenii Za Granitsei Sudebnykh i Vnesudebnykh 
Dokumentov po Grazhdanskim ili Torgovym Delam” [Federal Law dated Feb. 12, 
2001 No. 10-FZ “On Accession of the Russian Federation to the Convention on the 
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters”], Ros. Gaz. Feb. 15, 2001.  [Hereinafter Russian Implementing Statute]] 
26 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15, cl. 4 
(“Universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as 
international agreements of the Russian Federation should be an integral part of 
its legal system. If an international agreement of the Russian Federation 
establishes rules, which differ from those stipulated by law, then the rules of the 
international agreement shall be applied.”). 
27 Id. art. 125, cl. 6 (mandating that “[a]cts or certain provisions thereof, which 
are recognized as unconstitutional, shall lose force; international treaties of the 
Russian Federation, which do not correspond to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, shall not be implemented or used.”). 
28 See, e.g., Peter Krug, Internalizing European Court of Human Rights 
Interpretations: Russia’s Courts of General Jurisdiction and New Directions in Civil 
Defamation Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 45–46 (2006) (observing that Russia is a 
party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
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recognizing them as customary international law.29  In particular, 
the United States has invoked — thereby implicitly recognizing — 
the Vienna Convention protocols governing termination or 
suspension of treaties in the event of material breach by a state 
party.30 
1.3. The Breakdown of Russo-American Hague Service Convention 
Relations 
As noted above, each party to the Convention must establish a 
Central Authority to process transnational service requests.31  
There has, however, been some dispute as to whether the duties of 
the Central Authority must be carried out by government officials, 
or whether they can be delegated to a private company32 and, in 
either case, whether a fee can be charged for effecting service on 
behalf of a foreign party. 
The United States brought this issue to the forefront of Hague 
Conference politics when it outsourced the duties of its Central 
Authority to a private company.  The process commenced with a 
series of letters to the Hague Conference beginning in 2002 in 
which the United States announced its intention to initiate (and, 
eventually, its successful completion of) this privatization process.  
The U.S. Department of Justice ultimately awarded the contract to 
Process Forwarding International (“PFI”).33  Throughout the 
process, the Department of Justice explicitly maintained that it was 
merely delegating the tasks of the Central Authority and not 
actually designating a new Central Authority or transferring its 
ultimate responsibilities as Central Authority.34 
 
29 See, e.g., Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 299–300 (1988) (describing 
instances in which the U.S. government has demonstrated that it considers itself 
bound by terms of the Vienna Convention). 
30 Id. at 300; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, opened 
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
31 See supra Section 1.1. 
32 See Emily Fishbein Johnson, Note, Privatizing the Duties of the Central 
Authority: Should International Service of Process Be Up For Bid?, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 769, 778–79 (2005) (describing American efforts to construe the Hague 
Convention terms more broadly in order to allow private process servers to act for 
the Central Authority). 
33 Letter from United States to Hague Conference Depositary (Aug. 21, 2003), 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/outsourcing14.pdf. 
34 Id. 
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The United States formally announced to the Permanent 
Bureau of the Hague Conference that PFI was assuming the duties 
of the Central Authority on April 15, 2003.35  Since then, PFI has 
exercised exclusive authority to transmit outgoing requests for 
service of process abroad and to process incoming service requests 
as it discharges the duties of the United States Central Authority 
under Article 2 of the Convention.36  Since June 1, 2003,37 PFI has 
charged a processing fee to cover its costs.38 
Overall, PFI’s tenure as the U.S. Central Authority has been 
successful.  PFI has achieved much faster processing times in 
effecting service in the United States than the U.S. Marshals that 
carried out this duty previously, reducing turnaround time from 
six months to around six weeks.39  Though a handful of Hague 
Service Convention member states have registered objections to the 
PFI privatization,40 it generally enjoys “international acceptance.”41 
Nevertheless, the Russian government has chosen to interpret 
the imposition of a fee for PFI’s services as a fundamental breach of 
the Convention.42  A month after PFI began charging fees, “Russia 
 
35 Press Release, United States of America Central Authority under the 
Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Apr. 15, 2003), 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2003&varevent=5. 
36 Johnson, supra note 32, at 781. 
37 State Department Website, supra note 9. 
38 Currently, the processing fee charged by PFI is $95 per request.  See Letter 
from United States to Hague Depository, supra note 33. 
39 Johnson, supra note 32, at 782, 789 (concluding that outsourcing to PFI was 
a success). 
40 These objections and the countermeasures these states employ are 
discussed below.  Russia and Korea are currently the only two countries in which 
PFI’s designation as the U.S. Central Authority precludes all Hague Service 
Convention assistance.  Id. at 789. 
41 Id. at 782 (noting that the 2003 Special Commission on the Practical 
Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence and Service Conventions determined 
that the “terms of the Convention do not preclude a Central Authority from 
contracting activities under the Convention to a private entity, while retaining its 
status as Central Authority and ultimate responsibility for its obligations under 
the Convention”). 
42 For a brief description of the events that led Russia to claim the Convention 
had been breached from a Russian perspective, see Aleksandr A. Chikalov, 
Mezhdunarodnoe usynovlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Sudebnye porucheniia po 
semeinym delam s uchastiem inostrannogo elementa [International Adoption in 
the Russian Federation: Judicial Service in Family Maters Involving International 
Elements] (Sept. 13  2008) available at http://www.allpravo.ru/diploma/doc39p 
/instrum6233/ (Russ.).   
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unilaterally suspended all judicial cooperation with the United 
States in civil and commercial matters.”43  That fall, a Special 
Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, 
Evidence and Service Convention convened at the Hague 
Conference to discuss the role of private contractors under the 
Convention.  The Special Commission’s report unequivocally 
states that each state party is free to “determine its own model” of 
Central Authority organization, including “contracting activities 
under the Convention to a private entity” while retaining the 
formal status and responsibility of the Central Authority under the 
Convention.44  The Russian Federation declined to support this 
recommendation and reserved its position.45 
Over a year later, on December 3, 2004, Russia deposited a 
declaration with the Dutch Foreign Ministry in its capacity as 
keeper of the treaty repository formally explaining its opposition to 
the sorts of fees imposed by the United States, though the 
declaration does not mention any specific country or contractor.  
The declaration reads: 
The Russian Federation assumes that in accordance with 
Article 12 of the Convention the service of judicial 
documents coming from a Contracting State shall not give 
rise to any payment or reimbursement of taxes or costs for 
the services rendered by the State addressed.  Collection of 
such costs (with the exception of those provided for by 
subparagraphs a) and b) of the second paragraph of Article 
12) by any Contracting State shall be viewed by the Russian 
Federation as refusal to uphold the Convention in relation 
to the Russian Federation, and, consequently, the Russian 
Federation shall not apply the Convention in relation to this 
Contracting State.46 
 
43 State Department Website, supra note 9. 
44 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICAL 
OPERATION OF THE HAGUE APOSTILLE, EVIDENCE AND SERVICE CONVENTIONS 10 (Nov. 
20, 2003), http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/lse_concl_e.pdf [hereinafter 
SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT].  The Special Commission included representatives 
of 57 member states.  Id. at 3. 
45 State Department Website, supra note 9. 
46 See Russian reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention on 
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters of 15 November 1965, available at http://www.hcch.net 
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A series of meetings at which the U.S. interpretation of the 
Convention has been endorsed by the Hague Conference has failed 
to persuade Russia to modify its position.47 
2. RUSSIA’S APPEAL TO ARTICLE 12:  FISHY CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUGGEST THAT THE ARTICLE 12                   
ARGUMENT IS A RED HERRING 
Russia’s explanation for its decision to suspend Convention 
assistance to the United States appears pretextual for a number of 
reasons.  To begin with, the odd timeline of the Russo-American 
dispute and Russia’s own approach to its Hague Service 
Convention obligations suggest that Russia’s legal argument may 
be insincere.  The weakness of Russia’s position under 
international law further suggests that considerations other than 
compliance with international legal obligations influenced Russian 
policy in this case.  This is the case of regardless to whether the 
Russian declaration is analyzed as a reservation or as a 
countermeasure.  Finally, the text of Russia’s pre-reservation 
ratification legislation indicates that Russia had long understood 
and accepted that fees might be charged for effecting service before 
radically changing its position in 2003. 
2.1. The Curious Timing of Russia’s Hague Service Convention 
Participation and Policies Reveal Three International Law 
Violations 
The lag time between Russia’s accession to the Convention, its 
suspension of Convention assistance to the United States, its 
formal reservation, and its fulfillment of its own obligations under 
the treaty raise a red flag.  As a party to the Vienna Convention,48 
 
/upload/decl14_ru.pdf, translated in Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, Declarations Reservations, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status 
.comment&csid=418&disp=resdn (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); see also State 
Department Website, supra note 9 (reprinting and briefly discussing the Russian 
declaration). 
47 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Seminar, Ekaterinburg, 
Russ., May 15–16, 2008, Hague 1965 Service Convention & Hague 1970 Evidence 
Convention, http://www.hcch.net/upload/ekaterinburg_conclusions_e.pdf 
[hereinafter Ekaterinburg Seminar]; Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, Second Seminar, Saint Petersburg, Russ., Jan. 30–31, 2007, Service of Process 
Under the Hague 1965 Service Convention, http://www.hcch.net/upload 
/spseminar_concl_e.pdf. 
48 See Krug, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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Russia is obligated to abide by its provisions, including those 
governing preservation of a treaty’s object and purpose49 and those 
regulating treaty reservations.50  By unilaterally suspending the 
Convention with regard to the United States, entering an invalid 
reservation, and failing to abide by the terms of the Hague Service 
Convention, Russia demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward 
international legal obligations that is at odds with the country’s 
hard-line interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention. 
2.1.1. Suspension of the Convention in 2003 Violated 
International Law 
International law applies to all states “and every state is 
obliged to give it effect.”51  A foundational principle of 
international law is pacta sunt servanda; even a domestic 
constitutional conflict does not excuse treaty violations under 
international law.52  In any case, no such conflict exists in Russia.  
In addition to Russia’s constitutional approval of the supremacy of 
international treaties,53 domestic Russian legislation on treaty 
interpretation and application mirrors Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention, providing that actions by a treaty signatory which 
would deprive a treaty “of its object and purposes” violate 
international law.54  Taking its cue from the Vienna Convention, 
Russian legislation would allow suspension of the nation’s treaty 
obligations in the face of a material breach by another state party.55  
However, the U.S. privatization and fee structure are simply not a 
material breach of the Convention.  The Hague Conference 
 
49 Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 18. 
50 See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Treaty Reservations and the 
Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2003) 
(describing provisions of the Vienna Convention governing reservations). 
51 Kim M. Forcino, Note, International Service of Process: The Trend Moves Away 
From Uniformity, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 485, 499 (1996) (citing LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (3d ed. 1993)). 
52 See, e.g., William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and 
National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251 
(2006) (examining the intersection of international law principles and the U.S. 
domestic legal system). 
53 See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution], supra 
notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
54 WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE LAW OF TREATIES IN RUSSIA AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 49 (2002). 
55 Id. at 200. 
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addressed the issue three decades ago, explaining that the primary 
problem of fees was the difficulty “in determining the amount of 
and obtaining a check for payment in a foreign currency,” not the 
charging of fees or any particular fee amount.56  These problems 
are now more easily overcome than they were in 1977.  It does not 
help the Russian case that, under similar circumstances, the Soviet 
Union charged a processing fee for handling letters of request for 
judicial assistance under the Moscow Agreement prior to Russia’s 
accession to the Hague Service Convention.57 
Nor is there any indication that delegating duties to a private 
company is a material breach, as long as the United States retains 
ultimate responsibility, which it has.58  Indeed, discussion in the 
Russian legal community has advocated such outsourcing to 
improve Russia’s own Hague Service Convention performance.59  
To this end, Russia currently uses commercial courier services to 
transmit requests abroad and commercial translation services to 
translate outgoing requests from Russian into the necessary 
language—practices mentioned with approval by the Hague 
Conference.60  Such use of private companies to support improved 
performance of a country’s Convention obligations thus only 
appears to bother Russia when it takes place in the United States. 
 
56 Georges A.L. Droz, A Comment on the Role of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (1994). 
57 Tatyana Gidirimski, Comment, Service of United States Process in Russia 
Under Rule 4(F) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 691, 
702 (2001). 
58 See Letter from United States to Hague Conference Depositary, supra note 
33 (stating that the U.S. has decided to outsource the Central Authority’s service 
of process activity to a private company). 
59 See A.E. Zueva, Problemy primeneniia gaagskoi konventsii 1965 goda O 
vruchenii sudebnykh i vnesudebnykh dokumentov po grazhdanskim i torgovym delam, 
ARBITRAZHNYE SPORY, [Problems/Questions in Applying the 1965 Hague 
Convention on Service of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters], Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.kadis.ru/daily 
/dayprof.phtml?id=36360 (suggesting that the “American experience” with a 
private organization responsible for forwarding Hague service requests could be 
successfully applied in Russia). 
60 See Ekaterinburg Seminar, supra note 47 (noting the great progress that has 
been made in Russia with regard to the “effective implementation” of the Hague 
Service Convention, especially in expediting service requests). 
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2.1.2. Russia’s Reservation after Ratification Is Ineffective Under 
the Vienna Convention 
Russia’s violation of the Convention is not cured by its 
statement, even if one interprets its declaration regarding Article 
12 as a reservation. 
The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as “a unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, 
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”61  
The language of the Vienna Convention indicates that reservations 
must be made prior to ratification.62  As noted above, Russia 
ratified the Hague Service Convention in 2001, suspended judicial 
cooperation in 2003, and formally entered its reservation in 2004.63  
Russia’s reservation thus came too late to satisfy the requirements 
of the Vienna Convention, violating the Convention’s implied 
prohibition of reservations after ratification and failing to cure 
Russia’s continuing violation of the Convention with regard to the 
United States. 
2.1.3. Russia Failed to Provide a Functioning Central Authority 
for Four Years, Violating a Fundamental Hague Service 
Convention Obligation 
Russia’s strict stance regarding Article 12 of the Convention 
appears peculiar given the country’s failure to provide member 
states access to a functioning Central Authority of its own until 
2005.64  In fact, the Russian government first identified its Central 
 
61 Vienna Convention, supra note 30, art. 2(1)(d). 
62 See, e.g., Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations 
Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 331 
(2005) (noting that “there is no basis in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties for a reservation after ratification”). 
63 See supra Section 1 (providing an overview of the Hague Service 
Convention). 
64 See Service of Process Under the Hague 1965 Service Convention—A 
Seminar of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 4–5 2005,  
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/concl14_2005en.pdf (“welcoming” the 
Russian government’s designation of a Central Authority); see also Zueva, supra 
note 59 (noting that the Russian Federation signed and ratified the Convention in 
2001, but only designated the Ministry of Justice as its Convention “Central 
Authority” in 2005).  
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Authority by presidential decree only in August of 2004.65  
Insistence on a fine point of treaty interpretation hardly seems 
appropriate coming from a state that has failed to meet the most 
basic obligation of the treaty regime.66 
2.2. Russia’s Implementing Legislation Anticipated Reciprocal Fees 
and Alternative Central Authorities 
Russia memorialized the terms of its accession to the 
Convention in a federal statute.67  This statute indicates in two 
ways that the Russian Federation expected regimes of reciprocal 
fees to exist.  First, Article 26 of the statute specifically authorizes 
state parties to request reimbursement for service-related expenses, 
and notes that “when a state requests [such fees], any other 
agreeing state may request reciprocal fees from that state.”68  
Second, the statute features a “dog that didn’t bark.”  Article 12 of 
the statute provides that a state may refuse service under the 
Convention where the service requested is beyond the authority of 
the court addressed, or where such service would infringe state 
sovereignty or damage state security.69  Assuming that expressio 
unius est exclusion alterius translates into Russian, these specific 
grounds for refusing service preclude additional rationales not 
expressed in the statute.70 
 
65 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot Aug. 24, 2004 N. 1101 “O 
Tsentral’nom Organe Rossiiskoi Federatsii Po Konventsii O Vruchenii Za 
Granitsei Sudebnykh i Vnesudebnykh Dokumentov Po Grazhdanskim Ili 
Torgovym Delam” [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 24 
August 2004 No. 1101 “Regarding the Central Authority of the Russian Federation 
under the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters”] available at http://www.minjust               
.rostov.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=60&Itemid=48 
(designating the Russian Ministry of Justice as Convention Central Authority).  
66 See Hawkins supra note 14, at 213–15 (discussing the essential importance 
of the Central Authority in the Hague Service Convention system). 
67 See Russian Implementing Statute, supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
68 Id. art. 26. 
69 Id. art. 12. 
70 Research has not revealed any indication that the U.S. Hague Service 
Convention interpretation might conflict with the Russian Constitution, which 
would be a conceivable alternative ground for Russia’s refusal to uphold its 
Convention obligations toward the United States. See Konstitutsiia Rossiskoi 
Federatsi [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 125 cl. 6 (Russ.) (mandating that “[a]cts or 
their certain provisions recognized as unconstitutional shall become invalid; 
international treaties and agreements not corresponding to the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation shall not be liable for enforcement and application”). 
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2.2.1. The Opinion of the Special Commission and State Practice 
Confirm That the United States’ Hague Service Convention 
Practices Are Legal 
As noted above, the Special Commission clearly indicated that 
the United States may privatize and charge a fee for its Central 
Authority functions.71  This opinion is only strengthened by 
evidence of state practice. 
Under international law, concrete actions taken by states are 
“weighed most heavily as evidence of state practice.”72  It is thus 
significant that other countries charge fees to cover the costs of 
service.  Canada, for example, charged a fee for effecting service 
under the Convention before the United States outsourced to PFI.73  
Other states, such as Italy and China, have responded to the 
charging of fees by PFI by merely charging reciprocal fees rather 
than suspending cooperation entirely.74  Russia’s hard-line refusal 
to extend any judicial assistance under the Convention whatsoever 
is a clear outlier in this context. 
2.2.2. As a Countermeasure, Russia’s Suspension of Cooperation 
is Excessive 
Interpreting Russia’s suspension of Convention assistance to 
the United States as a countermeasure, it once again appears that 
Russia is in violation of its international legal obligations.  Under 
international law, countermeasures must be deployed for the 
purpose of inducing the other state’s “future compliance with 
international law” and “must be proportionate to the violation they 
seek to remedy.”75  Thus, for example, states that object to the 
 
71 See Special Commission Report, supra note 44 (stating that each state party 
is free to “determine its own model” of Central Authority organization, including 
“contracting activities under the Convention to a private entity” while retaining 
the formal status and responsibility of the Central Authority under the 
Convention). 
72 Stephanie L. Kotecki, Comment, The Human Rights Costs of China’s Arms 
Sales to Sudan: A Violation of International Law on Two Fronts, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 
J. 209, 214 (2008) (citation omitted). 
73 See Johnson, supra note 32, at 786 (“Prior to PFI’s contract, Canada was the 
only signatory to the Hague Service Convention to declare a specific fee for 
service of process. . . Still other states impose reciprocal fees upon countries 
charging fees for service.”). 
74 Id. 
75  John C. Dehn, Permissible Perfidy? Analysing the Colombian Hostage Rescue, 
the Capture of Rebel Leaders and the World’s Reaction, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 627, 648 
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United States charging fees for service through PFI have charged 
reciprocal fees for service requests originating in the United 
States.76  Russia, meanwhile, has elected to suspend performance of 
its obligations under the treaty entirely.  Though non-performance 
might be an allowable countermeasure under some 
circumstances,77 it hardly seems proportionate where lesser 
measures, namely the charging of reciprocal fees, are readily 
available and are just as likely to encourage the United States to 
adopt Russia’s position. 
3. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR RUSSIA’S HAGUE SERVICE 
CONVENTION POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 
It thus appears unlikely that international law motivated 
Russia to adopt its interpretation of the Convention.  Rather, the 
facts of the Russo-American Hague Service Convention dispute are 
consistent with alternative explanations characterizing the Russian 
suspension of judicial cooperation as a foreign policy conflict, not a 
legal decision.  This theory is borne out by contemporary political 
developments in the Russo-American relationship, which 
underwent a dramatic shift just as Russia’s Hague Service 
Convention policy toward the United States suddenly changed.  It 
is also consistent with structural and historical characteristics of the 
Russian legal system which make Russian private international law 
policy particularly susceptible to executive-branch influence 
relative to other nations, including the United States. 
 
(2008).  See also Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The 
Attractions of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 329 (2008) 
(applying countermeasures principles in the context of World Trade Organization 
disputes, noting that “the general regime on countermeasures in public 
international law explicitly provides that a state injured by a wrongful act may 
only take countermeasures against the state responsible in order to induce that 
state to comply with its obligations”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
76 See Johnson, supra note 32, at 786 (noting that countries such as Italy and 
China have adjusted to require payment for certain service of process after this 
day). 
77 Dehn, supra note 75, at 649 (“Countermeasures are ‘limited to the non-
performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking’ the 
countermeasures.”) (citation omitted). 
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3.1. The Iraq War and the Hague Service Convention Dispute: 
Matching Timelines 
After September 11, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
was the first foreign leader to call U.S. President George W. Bush to 
offer his condolences and assistance.78  The sincerity of Russian 
support was demonstrated by significant, concrete Russian help in 
the early stages of Washington’s Global War on Terror, including 
the exercise of Russian influence in Central Asia to allow the use of 
airspace and airfields critical to operations in Afghanistan.79  This 
cooperative spirit extended to arms reductions talks that same 
year, suggesting that a new era had dawned in Russian foreign 
policy towards the United States.80 
However, as the United States prepared to invade Iraq in the 
spring of 2003, Russian support melted away.  Putin ultimately 
made it clear that he “firmly opposed” the invasion.81  The Iraq 
question was widely considered a bellwether for the future of 
Russian foreign policy toward the United States,82 and seems to 
have indeed been a turning point in relations between the two 
countries.  Since the invasion, the Russo-American relationship has 
been marked by a deepening series of disagreements.83 
 
78 See, e.g., Robin Wright, Ties That Terrorism Transformed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2002, at 4 (referencing the Putin call). 
79 See, e.g., Editorial, Good From Evil: Terrorism United U.S., Russia to End Arms 
Race, BRADENTON HERALD (Florida), Nov. 16, 2001, at 10C (emphasizing the 
importance of Russia’s role in the fight against terrorism where Russia and the 
U.S. have “put aside differences and allied against a common enemy,” bin Laden 
and his Al Qaida network). 
80 See, e.g., Bob Kemper, Russia, U.S. Go Forward on Arms: Nuclear Weapons, 
ABM Pact on Table, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2001, at 1 (reporting that Bush and Putin 
had “made progress on a plan to dramatically reduce their nations’ nuclear 
arsenals”); see also Editorial, Putin’s Terrible Dilemma, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 8, 
2003, at 6 (observing that Putin had taken “sizeable political risks” at home by 
supporting U.S. efforts to secure Central Asian basing for U.S. troops and U.S. 
policy regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). 
81 C. J. Chivers, Russia Parades Its Military In an Echo of Soviet Days, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2008, at A9. 
82 See, e.g., Michael Wines, Putin’s Daunting Choice: Which West to Join, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at A12 (discussing the decision Russia must make between 
supporting either Europe or America). 
83 See Peter Grier, Crises Cast Doubt on Bush’s Strategy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2008 (noting the shift in relations between the United States 
and Russia from the first Bush-Putin meeting in 2001 to the 2008 Russian invasion 
of Georgia); see also David Rising, Russia: Better U.S. Ties Will Take Time, CHI. TRIB., 
Feb. 9, 2009, at 17 (noting hiccups in U.S. relations with Russia, including disputes 
over NATO expansion and American military bases in Central Asia); Fred Hiatt, 
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Russia’s embrace of the Hague Service Convention and 
subsequent decision to consider the United States in breach of the 
Convention corresponds roughly with the timeline described 
above, with a positive development in 2001 followed by a marked 
downturn in relations in the summer of 2003.  Russia acceded to 
the Hague Service Convention in 2001, with the Convention 
entering into force in Russia that same year.84  However, in July of 
2003, as the war in Iraq continued, Russia notified the United 
States that it would no longer process U.S. requests for service sent 
pursuant to the Hague Service Convention.85 
3.2. The Role of Civil Law Discomfort With Common Law Litigation 
Practices:  Present, But Not Decisive 
Brought up in the civil law tradition, Russian lawyers tend to 
approach litigation and service of process in particular quite 
differently from their common law counterparts.  As Born 
observes, “[c]ivil law states generally regard service of judicial 
process as a sovereign act that may be performed in their territory 
only by the state’s own officials and in accordance with its own 
law.”86  This is certainly the case in Russia, which does not 
officially recognize service other than that effected by—not merely 
through—Russian courts.87  Judges in Russia, in keeping with 
standard civil law practice, are responsible for directing pretrial 
litigation in areas reserved for the parties themselves in common 
law systems.88  Since the gap between the two systems is so wide, 
 
A Russia Reality Check, WASH. POST, B7, Feb. 8, 2009 (describing conflicting foreign 
policies of Russia and the U.S. since the fall of the Soviet Union).  Given the recent 
controversy over the role of Russian influence in the Kyrgyz government’s 
decision to reconsider the United States’ use of Manas Air Force Base in Bishkek, 
the contrast between the current state of affairs and Russia’s strong support in 
Central Asia in 2001 is especially stark. 
84 Service Convention Hague Status Table, supra note 3. 
85 See State Department Web site, supra note 9. 
86 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: 
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 774 (1996) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 471, cmt. B (1987)). 
87 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Response Russian 
Federation to 2008 Service Questionnaire 19 (2008), available at http://hcch.e                 
-vision.nl/upload/wop/2008russianfederation14.pdf [hereinafter RUSSIAN HAGUE 
QUESTIONNAIRE] (noting “[m]ethods other than a formal service are not provided 
for in the Russian legislation”). 
88 See, e.g., Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 696 (discussing the role of the judge in 
the Russian court system vis-à-vis pre-trial discovery). 
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and the potential for offense to civil law judges by common law 
litigators so great, bridging this difference is a major challenge the 
Hague Service Convention and its ilk must overcome, as their 
critics often mention.89 
Though it is difficult to isolate legal-cultural distance as a 
cause, it is interesting to note that the overwhelming majority of 
incoming requests for service reported by the Russian Federation 
Central Authority between 2004 and 2007 are from other civil law 
countries, with Great Britain hovering near the bottom of the list as 
the sole exception.90 
Yet the civil law/common law distinction alone does not 
explain Russia’s suspension of judicial assistance solely with the 
United States.  Though Great Britain is near the bottom of the list, it 
is still on the list, indicating that common law systems themselves 
are not so repugnant to Russia that it refuses to deal with them all.  
Further, the Russian implementing statute creates a mechanism to 
interface with a common law system.91  Thus, in practice and on 
paper, it seems Russia is prepared to cooperate with states that 
have common law legal systems.  A deeper analysis into Russian 
legal culture is therefore necessary to determine why the Russian 
government refuses to cooperate with the United States. 
3.3. Russian Legal History and Culture and the Development of 
Russian Private International Law Policy 
Particularly from an American perspective, private 
international law in Russia seems difficult to distinguish from 
“public” foreign policy.  As discussed above,92 Russia is a civil law 
country, requiring far more direct court participation in pre-trial 
service and evidence gathering procedures than is common in the 
United States.93  Yet, beyond this basic distinction, there is a 
 
89 See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1190–91 (describing the limited utility 
of the Hague conventions because of their failure to reconcile common law and 
civil law trial differences). 
90 RUSSIAN HAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE supra note 87, at 9. 
91 Russian Implementing Statute, supra note 25, art. 23.  
92 See supra Section 3.2. 
93 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives Into the 
First Year Civil Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 492–93 (2006) 
(highlighting distinction in service regimes between civil and common law 
jurisdictions); see also Johnson, supra note 32, at 777 (noting that distinctions 
between private and public law matters in civil law countries are relatively 
“complex”); Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 695 (noting “U.S. litigants are generally 
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traditional melding of public and private legal relationships in 
Russia,94 and a subordination of the law and lawyers to decision-
makers up the chain that results in a fundamentally different 
approach to private international law in Russia.  Sadly, “law and 
lawyers have not traditionally been accorded much power or 
status in Russia.”95  Legal developments in Russia are thus not 
guided by the legal profession, but are rather taking place in a field 
that has long been subordinated to power-centers elsewhere in the 
society.  It is thus necessary to consider this private international 
law dispute not merely in terms of the relationship between two 
legal establishments, but the relations between two fairly hostile 
states.96  This is consistent with a long history of private 
international law policy’s place in the Russian executive’s toolbox 
of foreign policy options, as described below. 
3.3.1. Imperial Russian Private International Law Policy 
Russian private international law policy has its foundations in 
Russia’s early participation in the formation of the formal modern 
private international law establishment.  The Russian Empire was a 
founding member of the Hague Conference, and a party to the 
Conference’s first Hague Convention, the Hague Convention on 
Civil Procedure, which entered into force on May 23, 1899.97  Czar 
Nicholas II was active in international organizations of the time, 
playing an “instrumental” role in disarmament conferences that 
same year.98  This policy of active engagement abroad led scholars 
to conclude that international institutions “played important roles 
 
unaccustomed to the view held by civil law countries that service of process is a 
sovereign act that must be carried out by state officials according to state law”). 
94 See FRANCES NETHERCOTT, RUSSIAN LEGAL CULTURE BEFORE AND AFTER 
COMMUNISM: CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 146 (2007) 
(observing, in the context of Russian criminal law reform, that the distinction 
between the private and public spheres has been “traditionally a blind spot in 
Russian legal culture”). 
95 GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (1996). 
96 See supra Section 3.1. (explaining recent breakdown of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and Russia following the Iraq war). 
97 Droz, supra note 56, at 3. 
98 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow’s Diplomacy in International Organizations, in 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF GEORGE GINSBURGS 339, 339 (Roger Clark et al. eds., 2001). 
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in Russia’s diplomacy of safeguarding and advancing state 
interests.”99 
After the October Revolution of 1917, the attitude of the 
Russian government to the outside world became somewhat more 
complicated.  Pragmatic use of private international law channels, 
however, continued. 
3.3.2. Private International Law in the Soviet Era 
As the Western world began to accept the Soviet government 
as a long-term member of the international establishment, the 
Soviet foreign policy administration expressed a willingness to 
participate in international organizations—even with non-socialist 
countries.100  In the 1930s, the Soviet Union thus entered into 
various international agreements, many of which had private 
international law implications.  These included international 
commercial arbitration agreements of various sorts,101 and the 1935 
“Moscow Agreement” between the Soviet Union and the United 
States.102  However, while these agreements concerned commercial 
relationships, they were hardly “private” international law.  Given 
the politicization of commercial activity in the Soviet Union, this is 
unsurprising.  More importantly, this was consistent with Soviet 
international law theory, which generally maintained that 
international law “directly affects only the rights and duties of the 
state proper,” not private citizens.103 
Trade agreements with foreign countries were doubly 
compartmentalized, as the Soviet state’s ideological and foreign 
policy commitments naturally made the Soviet Government wary 
of allowing private citizens direct contact with non-Soviet 
 
99 Id. 
100 See id., at 340 (discussing the famous Litvinov speech of September 18, 
1934 and stating that there was nothing “theoretically unacceptable” about all the 
Soviet states engaging in an association with non-socialist states). 
101 See, e.g., William B. Simons, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Under Russian Law: The (Ab)Use of The Public Policy Doctrine in Russian Courts, in 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE 373, 399 (Roger 
Clark et al. eds., 2001) (discussing Soviet-era international arbitration agreements 
between the Soviet Union and other nations). 
102 The Moscow Agreement remained an important element in Russo-U.S. 
relations even after the fall of the Soviet Union.  See Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 
706 (discussing applicability of the “Moscow Agreement” in 2001, prior to 
Russia’s Hague Service Convention accession). 
103 GEORGE GINSBURGS, FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW : STUDIES 
IN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1 (1998). 
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enterprises.104  Thus, all foreign trade from the 1930s through the 
Gorbachev years was conducted through a government monopoly 
administered by Foreign Trade Organizations [“FTOs”].105  These 
FTOs were in turn the subjects of international arbitration 
agreements between the Soviet Union and various Western 
countries, described as a “logical comprise to a mutual 
suspicion . . . of each other’s judicial and political systems.”106 
As the agreements were conducted on a case-by-case basis, 
there was surprisingly little consistency from treaty to treaty.  The 
Soviet Union’s trademark “uniformity and standardization” in 
other political and economic policy thus did not apply to trade 
treaties, even concerning such important issues as the terms of a 
public policy exception.107  Characterized by expediency, these 
agreements apparently gave “little regard to . . . systematic and 
theoretical issues . . . .”108  In addition, these agreements were 
generally vague on procedural details such as mechanisms for 
bringing enforcement actions.109 
Nor was the Soviet Union keen to recognize customary 
international law as a gap-filler.  Soviet legal theory “emphasized 
the place of the treaty” as the principal source of international law 
to the detriment of customary international law.110  This was 
consistent with the Soviet government’s general wariness of 
international law that it had not taken part in making, as such law 
“was considered to have taken shape under the influence of 
capitalist states and to contain propositions that did not square 
with the Soviet Union’s approach.”111  However, while even Soviet 
scholars recognized that Cold War expediency caused Soviet 
 
104 Indeed, foreign direct investment was prohibited in the Soviet Union until 
1987.  Simons, supra note 101, at 381 n.14. 
105 Id. at 387. 
106 Id. at 388. 
107 Id. at 391. 
108 KAZIMIERZ GRYZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (1965). 
109 See Simons, supra note 101, at 390–91 (explaining that applications to 
enforce foreign arbitral awards were made at higher level courts). 
110 See BUTLER, supra note 54, at 5-6 (noting that the Preamble marks a 
significant departure from traditional Soviet theory of international law, which 
identified the treaty as the main source of international law, which differed from 
general Soviet procedural rules for obtaining enforcement of domestic court 
judgments). 
111 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 61 (internal citation omitted). 
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violations of international law,112 the Soviet Union’s record in 
international commercial law was apparently quite respectable 
when it suited the government’s purpose.  Soviet FTOs, for 
example, consistently honored adverse arbitration awards made 
pursuant to international arbitration agreements in the mid to late 
Soviet period.113 
3.4. Post-Soviet Transition 
In its last years, the Soviet Union saw the beginnings of a shift 
in international law theory and policy.  By the late Gorbachev 
period, arguments appeared in the literature advocating against 
international law being “artificially divided into capitalist 
international law, socialist international law, and the international 
law of developing countries.”114  Soviet scholars thus began to 
revisit their hesitancy regarding Russian participation in a world 
legal system beyond treaties.115  In 1993, the Duma enacted a law 
on commercial arbitration in an effort to tap into “the international 
harmonization of commercial law,” the first time a “broad 
legislative basis” anchored the international system to the Russian 
domestic legal system.116  In 1995, Russia’s basic law on treaties, the 
Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of 
the Russian Federation, explicitly recognized the role of customary 
international law and Russia’s obligation to follow it.117  Similar 
 
112 See Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Reina A. Müllerson, The Primacy of 
International Law in World Politics, in PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 6, 8 
(Anthony Carty & Gennady Danilenko eds., 1990) (“Regretfully, the Soviet Union 
is not blameless in its approach to international law.”). 
113  Simons, supra note 101, at 394, 413–15 (arguing that, although there were 
no reports of a Soviet FTO refusing to honor an award against it, a reasonable 
investor might have insisted on certain conditions surrounding enforcement). 
114 Vereshchetin & Müllerson, supra note 112, at 9. 
115 Compare G.I. Tunkin, On the Primacy of International Law in Politics, in 
PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, reprinted in RUSSIAN LEGAL 
THEORY, at 609–16 (W. E. Butler ed. 1996) (arguing that the primacy of 
international law is necessary for the normal functioning of the inter-State 
system), with G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (L.N. Shestakov & 
William E. Butler eds., William E. Butler, trans., Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 
Publishers Ltd. 2d ed. 2003) (2000) (explaining the principles of “socialist 
internationalism”). 
116 Simons, supra note 101, at 398–99. 
117 See BUTLER, supra note 54, at 5. (“The Russian Federation favours 
undeviating compliance with treaty and customary norms and affirms its 
adherence to the basic principle of international law—the principle of the good-
faith fulfillment of international obligations.”). 
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language appears in the Russian Constitution.118  Finally, Russia 
formally rejoined the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law on December 6, 2001.119 
Nevertheless, progress was mixed across Russia’s international 
law portfolio, including in the private international law arena.  
First, structural peculiarities of Russia’s treaty-making and judicial 
systems make it difficult to understand the system.  Treaty-making 
authority is delegated to a variety of state organs, including courts, 
in the Russian Federation.120  The Supreme Arbitration Court is an 
interesting example.  The court is something of a Soviet holdover, 
as it has its roots in Soviet forums designed to deal with foreign 
trade in the era of FTOs.121  The court’s responsibilities regarding 
foreign trade relationships continue:  the court “presented” the 
legislation to the Duma that resulted in Russia’s accession to the 
Hague Service Convention,122 and is officially responsible for 
establishing and maintaining “international relationships and 
cooperation with supreme courts and specialized courts of various 
foreign countries.”123 
Yet the Arbitration Courts, like others in Russia, have suffered 
from a lack of judges trained in international law and treaty 
 
118 See Tatiana V. Tkachenko, National and International Aspects of Russian 
Insolvency Law: Problems and Possible Solutions, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC 751, 764 
(2008) (“Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates the 
principle that international treaties and widely accepted principles of 
international law are part of the Russian legal system.”). 
119 Press Release, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Russian 
Federation Rejoins the Hague Conference (June 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2001&varevent 
=19. 
120 See William E. Butler, Treaty Capacity and the Russian State Corporation, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 315 (2008) (noting that such “empowered organizations” act as 
government ministries or state committees “for most treaty purposes” under 
current Russian legislation).  It is unclear, however, if such “interdepartmental” 
treaties, which are not ratified by the Federal Assembly, take precedence over 
Russian federal law.  Id. at 313. 
121 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 141 (stating the Procedural Code of 
Arbitration of the Russian Federation “broadens the jurisdiction of arbitration 
courts to include cases involving foreign organizations, organizations with foreign 
investments, international organizations, the citizens and stateless persons 
engaged in entrepreneurial activity”). 
122 Tkachenko, supra note 118, at 765.  This court played a similar role in 
Russia’s accession to the Hague Evidence Convention.  Id. 
123 Id. 
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interpretation.124  This is a holdover of the limited role of judges in 
the Soviet system, who were “excessively dependent” on 
directions from the political leadership for guidance.125  Though so-
called “telephone law” has reportedly diminished greatly since the 
days when Soviet bureaucrats would literally pick up the phone to 
inform judges of their decisions, the generation of Russian judges 
used to “detailed and didactic” instructions from legislation or 
leaders has not wholly died out.126  What’s more, salaries and 
benefits for judges are subject to manipulation as they are “only 
partly defined in the law,” and are relatively low.127 
This has serious consequences for Russia’s international law 
practice, if not its policy.  In the Soviet period, treaty interpretation 
was the province of government ministries, generally the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs or, in the case of economic treaties, the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade.128  Though Russian courts may have the power to 
strike down legislation that violates international law, they must be 
prepared to exercise that power for it to mean anything. 
In sum, Russian international law policy, including private 
international law policy, remains more a political tool than an 
independent legal framework.  While this system has maintained 
fairly good compliance with international law in some areas,129 the 
dominance of political rather than legal actors may make Russia’s 
positions more unpredictable and harder to justify under 
international or even domestic Russian law.  Russia’s decision to 
suspend Hague Service Convention assistance to the United States 
may well stem from this power structure. 
4. CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION 
POLICY: THE IMPACT ON LITIGANTS IN U.S. COURTS AND 
 
124 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 121 (noting the poor international law 
training received by judges and a shortage of international law specialists 
practicing in Russia); id. at 141 (describing an “acute need” for Arbitration Court 
judges to be educated on international law). 
125 Id. at 122. 
126 Simons, supra note 101, at 468. 
127 Donald D. Barry, Decision-Making and Dissent in the Russian Federation 
Constitutional Court, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN 
EUROPE, supra note 10, at 1,10. 
128 GINSBURGS, supra note 103, at 119–20. 
129 Id. at 146 (noting that although “Russia’s performance in the law 
department lags far behind that of the leaders of the pack,” it is still ahead of 
many other countries). 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1. Consequences for Litigants in U.S. Courts 
Russia’s Hague Service Convention policy clearly impacts 
parties in U.S. courts with a need to effect service on Russian soil.  
Recognizing that the Convention is effectively a dead letter 
between the United States and Russia; U.S. federal district courts 
have authorized alternate service under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which would otherwise require compliance with the 
Hague Service Convention regime.130  This flexibility, however, 
does not offer much comfort to parties that may need to pursue 
enforcement actions on Russian soil.131 
With the primary Convention channel out of commission, none 
of the alternatives identified by the Convention are officially 
available.  Russia is not a party to any bilateral treaty allowing for 
direct judicial communication,132 does not recognize any form of 
service other than official service through Russian courts,133 and 
thus does not provide for alternate service via fax, email, or any 
other method,134 except for consular channels.135  Setting aside the 
fact that the Hague Service Convention is in large part  designed to  
address the general ineffectiveness of consular channels as a means 
of effecting service,136 Russia reportedly does not honor such 
requests from the United States.137 
 
130 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Media Servs. LLC, No. 06 Civ.15319, 2008 
WL 563470 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008) (permitting alternative service in light of 
Russia’s refusal to allow U.S. litigants to utilize Hague Service Convention 
procedures).  As discussed in Section 3, supra, U.S. courts have allowed alternate 
methods of service consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s due process 
requirements where the Hague Service Convention is not functioning.  See, e.g., 
Arista Records, 2008 WL 563470, at *1 (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(f)). 
131 Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 695–96. 
132 RUSSIAN HAGUE QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 87, at 12. 
133 Id. at 18–19. 
134 Id. at 22. 
135 Id. at 24. 
136 See, e.g., Panagiota Kelali, Comment, Provisional Relief in Transnational 
Litigation in the Internet Era: What is in the US Best Interest?, 24 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 263, 270 n.39 (2006) (discussing slow, cumbersome nature of 
requests through official diplomatic channels in the context of cybercrime 
investigations) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Robert M. 
Kimmitt, International Law in the War on Narcotics, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 302, 
306 (1990) (describing the traditional letters-rogatory system as “less efficient”));  
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In sum, U.S. litigants are now worse off than they were before 
Russia signed the Convention.  Suspension of the Convention 
essentially sets the clock back to 2001, when observers noted that 
letters of request through diplomatic channels were the only 
realistic means of effecting service in Russia that could potentially 
support a later enforcement action through Russian courts.138  With 
the diplomatic channel non-functional as well, no options remain 
to parties in U.S. courts that satisfy both Russian domestic law and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.139 
4.2. International Arbitration: Viable Alternative or Fire to the 
Convention’s Frying Pan? 
Unfortunately, international arbitration may not be an 
attractive alternative to the sorts of transnational litigation which 
require working Hague Service Convention channels between the 
United States and Russia.  Judgments won in arbitral proceedings 
must still be enforced where the losing party’s assets are located.  
Russia’s record in this respect is mixed.140  If anything, Russian 
courts may be “gradually becoming more hostile to the 
enforcement of arbitration awards.”141  The same “gap between 
theory and practice” that characterizes Russia’s Hague Service 
 
see also Tamayo, supra note 21, at 232 (describing situation in which the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia “permitted service of process only through letters rogatory, a 
slow process requiring government intervention and taking up to one-and-a-half 
years to complete”) (citing Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2002)). 
137 See State Department Website, supra note 9 (“In July 2003, Russia 
suspended all judicial cooperation with the United States in civil and commercial 
matters.”). 
138 Gidirimski, supra note 57, at 707. 
139 For an analysis of this Catch 22 prior to Russia’s ratification of the Hague 
Service Convention, see id. at 707-08, 714-15. 
140 See William R. Spiegelberger, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
Russia: An Analysis of the Relevant Treaties, Laws, And Cases, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
261, 304 (2005) (observing that “Russian courts seem to enforce foreign arbitration 
awards at a rate lower than the international average,” despite procedural and 
substantive law consistent with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law). 
141 Daniel S. Meyers, In Defense of the International Treaty Arbitration System, 31 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 47, 77 n.160 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/6
2009] OUT OF SERVICE 619 
 
Convention policy thus seems to impact its participation in 
international arbitration systems.142 
5. CONCLUSION 
Despite the best efforts of the Hague Conference, the Russo-
American Hague Service Convention impasse continues.  The 
episode does not bode well for the future of the Russo-American 
relationship and is especially alarming to parties that might need 
workable transnational commercial litigation channels between the 
two countries. 
The dispute is also strong evidence that transnational 
commercial litigation is likely to remain “complex, difficult, and 
inefficient.”143 .  As this failure of the Hague Conference proves its 
critics right,144 it should spur the Conference and its members to 
redouble their efforts to strive toward a “uniform normative 
framework” in which the global community can craft international 
legal solutions.145  Demand for such a framework will not soon 
vanish; where there are international transactions, there will be 
international litigation.146  Indeed, because functional private 
international law regimes can be considered not merely a result of, 
but a prerequisite to robust global economic development,147 the 
consequences of continued failure in this arena are more serious 
than procedural headaches, delays or inconvenience.  On the bright 
side, the Russo-American experience with the Hague Service 
 
142 Spiegelberger, supra note 140, at 304; see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal 
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 
826 n.55 (2001) (“In Russia, for example, courts routinely refuse to enforce 
international arbitration awards and sometimes reject claims by foreign creditors 
on peculiar grounds.”). 
143 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1118. 
144 Id. at 1190–91 (citations omitted). 
145 Christophe Bernasconi, Some Observations from the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 350 (2007). 
146 See Dowling, supra note 17, at 465 (“You cannot set up a deal properly if 
you do not plan for what will happen if the deal goes bad.”). 
147 See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 71 (2008) (“Good courts are central to sustained economic 
development.”); see also Meyers, supra note 141 at 56–58 (noting that, despite 
disagreement as to whether “increasing legal protections for foreign investments 
actually increases the volume of such investments,” and whether increasing 
foreign investment actually increases economic development, nobody has yet 
proven otherwise). 
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Convention may serve to identify the political and cultural hurdles 
the Hague Conference must clear to realize its goals. 
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